Dr. Cheung discusses China’s techno-security state in the Department’s guest lecture
Author: Clara Snyder
Dr. Cheung outlined China’s ambitious 21st-century project to develop a techno-security state—an innovation-centered, security-maximizing regime that meets national security needs by emphasizing economic, technological, and military power. China’s embrace of this transformation comes as a result of shifting threat perceptions, evolving geopolitical dynamics, and President Xi Jinping’s rise to centralized power. In building up China’s techno-security state, Xi aims to secure the Chinese Communist Party’s grip on power and prepare for further intensified strategic competition with the US.
In the decades preceding Xi’s leadership, national priorities in China were overwhelmingly focused on economic development and industrial leadership. Previous Chinese administrations had limited investments in defense and national security issues. Dr. Cheung described China under Xi as a security-maximizing state that has undergone a radical recalibration in the center of gravity of national priorities since his rise to power. By shifting China’s national security aims towards political regime security and building a state on a technological and economic foundation, Xi has created a techno-security regime capable of challenging global leadership. Cheung points to Xi’s interpretation of the downfall of the Soviet Union as a key motivator for the rise of the Chinese techno-security state. From Xi’s perspective, securing the rule of the Communist Party is crucial to avoiding the Soviet Union’s fate and ensuring the long-term rise of China.
Dr. Cheung identifies four key pillars that support the proliferation of China’s techno-security state: national security, innovation-driven development, intensified military modernization, and the tight integration of military and civilian systems. China’s military aims are outlined in the third and fourth pillars, which focus on military strengthening and military-civilian fusion (MCF). Xi’s long-term strategic military vision seeks to fully modernize the People’s Liberation Army by 2035 and to challenge the US for global military leadership by 2049. These long-term modernization objectives were expected to be achieved in peacetime, but have accelerated with the rise of tensions and strategic threats. China is further pursuing its military aims through MCF, which Cheung described as a national-level strategy that integrates civilian and military sectors to harness state-wide innovation. Although MCF is no longer publicly emphasized by Chinese authorities due to Western scrutiny, it is still intensely pursued.
Dr. Cheung frames the U.S.-China rivalry as a “new Cold War,” but makes key distinctions from the ideological and military confrontation of the U.S.-USSR Cold War. Today’s great power competition involves a geostrategic, geoeconomic, and technological rivalry, which lacks distinctive boundaries between economic security, national security, and innovation. In the “new Cold War”, the U.S.-China competition revolves around the superior integration of technological innovation into both commercial and military spheres. The U.S.’s strength in the previous Cold War came from its dual-use innovation ecosystem, where universities and companies served both the economic and defense sectors. China’s techno-security state is now mimicking this model. Standing in stark contrast between China under Xi and the Cold War-era U.S. is the nature of governance. Dr. Cheung suggests that the outcome of this “new Cold War” may depend on the ultimate performance of the two distinct governance models.
At the end of the lecture, Dr. Cheung outlined Russia’s complicated position in China’s strategic calculus. Rather than describing the relationship as an alliance, he opts to identify the dynamic as an “opportunistic entente”. Although Russia and its war on Ukraine benefit China by diverting Western focus and resources, Russia’s limited technological-economic utility strains the partnership. According to Dr, Cheung, China views Russia’s war on Ukraine as a short-term problem. The two will re-engage without limits once the war has concluded, and will be driven even closer if the U.S. escalates its great power competition. Although the partnership is asymmetrical due to China’s notable economic and technological advantages, China sees Russia as a strategic collaborator to support its power rivalry with the U.S.
The Chinese techno-security state concept outlined by Tai Ming Cheung represents the massive reconfiguration of national priorities that China has embraced in response to perceived threats. Although China under Xi has made significant strides in establishing itself as a politically stable, technologically self-reliant, and militarily modernized global power, it lacks a strong alliance structure. Although tactically useful, China’s relationship with Russia is riddled with limitations and historic baggage that prevent the partnership from developing into a fruitful, secure alliance. The ultimate test in the current great power competition will be whether China’s state-led model can outpace the U.S.’s innovative capabilities and alliance network.
Clara Snyder is a senior at Baylor University majoring in International Studies and minoring in Journalism.
The recording of the lecture is available here: https://mediaspace.baylor.edu/media/Cheung+Lecture+4+1+25/1_fof9ro7e