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# Public Opinion and the Military: A Multivariate Exploration of Attitudes in Texas<sup>1</sup>

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*This study examines public opinion about the U.S. military across five dimensions of analysis using a Texas statewide survey that includes a rare oversample of Latino and African American respondents (four hundred each). It finds that while support for the military remains high, attitudes vary across a cluster of important military-related issues and within the factors that influence them. Evidence from multivariate regression analysis demonstrates that not only do demographic and political factors help shape these opinions, they may mediate the role race/ethnicity plays in influencing attitudes. This study adds greater nuance to the understanding of public opinion and the military, demonstrating that support for the military is neither all-encompassing nor monolithic. Scholars interested in military recruitment efforts and civil-military relations should take note of the gaps and divisions discovered in the “crucial case” of Texas.*

## **Military Support: How Far Does It Go and How Uniform Is It?**

In the United States, high confidence in the military is the norm. The American public has long rated the military as one of the most trusted institutions in the country. Since 1975, Gallup has asked the following question: “Please tell me how much confidence you, yourself, have in (the military)—a great deal, quite a lot, some, or very little?” (2014). Never has the military garnered less than 50 percent of the country’s

confidence. Today, with 74 percent of people expressing confidence, the military is the most trusted institution in the nation. This support may have important implications for civil-military relations, military-friendly personnel policies, and recruitment efforts within an all-volunteer force (AVF) reliant upon a citizenry advising its youth to join the military.

Broader research is, however, lacking on how far the support actually goes, and whether it varies by specific population groups (although see Goertzel 1987; Butler and Johnson 1991; Leal 2005). This study begins to fill this gap by examining public opinion about the U.S. military across five dimensions of analysis using a Texas statewide survey that includes a rare oversample of Latino and African American respondents (four hundred each). Besides asking about overall support for the military, questions were included to measure whether young people would be advised to join the military; whether a new draft is favored; whether “illegal or undocumented” immigrants should be allowed to serve in the military;<sup>2</sup> and whether these immigrants should be granted citizenship given they are allowed to serve. The examination then proceeds to determine how attitudes are influenced by racial/ethnic, demographic, and political factors. In doing so, the project explores whether high confidence in the military translates into

- 1) broader support across a cluster of important military-related issues; and/or
- 2) uniform support across a wide array of groups.

The study finds that while support for the military is high in Texas, a paradigmatic “promilitary” state, attitudes vary both across issues and within the factors that influence them. Evidence from multivariate regression analysis demonstrates that not only do demographic and political factors help shape opinions on military-related issues, they may mediate the role that race/ethnicity plays in forming attitudes about them. This study thus adds greater nuance to our understanding of public opinion and the military, demonstrating that support for the military is neither all-encompassing nor monolithic. It suggests that scholars interested in military recruitment efforts and civil-military relations should take note of the gaps and divisions in public opinion discovered in Texas.

### **Social Science, Public Opinion, and the Military**

Social scientific study of the military began during the Second World War with investigations into attitudes about the military and the war, the

motivations of soldiers, and the adjustment of veterans to civilian life (Stouffer et al. 1949).<sup>3</sup> Research has expanded into areas such as civil-military relations (Cohen 1985; Feaver and Kohn 2001; Huntington 1957; Janowitz 1964); the demographics of military service (Fligstein 1980; Segal and Verdugo 1994; Kirby, Harrell, and Sloan 2000; Kane 2006; Lutz 2008); race and the military (Murray 1971a, 1971b; Janowitz and Moskos 1974; Butler 1980; Moskos and Butler 1996; Titunik 2009); and how veteran status affects political participation and partisanship (Davis and Taylor 1987; Ellison 1992; Leal 1999; McNerney 2006).

Survey research is increasingly common in military sociology and has been used to investigate such topics as the class basis of military service during the Vietnam conflict (Mazur 1995; Wilson 1995); the attitudes held by military personnel and their spouses (Bachman, Blair, and Segal 1977; Segal and Tiggle 1997; Miller 1997; Halverson and Bliese 1996; Moore and Webb 2000; Franke 2001); and the influence of military experience on racial attitudes (Ellison 1992; Lawrence and Kane 1995). Additionally, a few scholars have used survey research to examine support for military expenditures (Kriesberg, Murray, and Ross 1982; Goertzel 1987); military service (Inglehart 1976); and the military in general (Mueller 1973; Gartner and Segura 1998).

However, few have explored attitudes across multiple dimensions. Even fewer researchers have simultaneously focused on how racial/ethnic, demographic, and political differences may structure orientations toward the military (however, see Schumm 1996). In both cases, survey data is largely lacking. This study seeks to overcome these problems and to contribute to a neglected line of scholarship—exploring multiple attitudes with important civil-military and military recruitment implications via an analysis of a relatively recent survey that includes both traditional and new questions relating to the military and military service.

### **Race/Ethnicity—Recruitment Concerns**

The study of race-/ethnicity-based differences of opinion toward the military are among the most important from a recruitment standpoint.<sup>4</sup> The Department of Defense is more dependent upon public opinion than are other governmental agencies. While no bureaucracy can ultimately achieve its objectives in a democracy without public support, an all-volunteer force requires more—specifically, it needs the commitment of tens of thousands of young people every year. The maintenance of the AVF therefore requires the support of not only enlistees, but also their

families, friends, teachers, counselors, and other influential community members. This is to say that if segments of the population are less enthusiastic about military service, future recruiting difficulties may result.

Latinos currently constitute the largest minority group in America, and by some estimates will reach one quarter of the population by the year 2050. As a result, the traditional black-white racial paradigm in American politics is slowly changing into a more complex black-white-Latino perspective. As a consequence, in order to meet numerical targets, the armed services must increasingly attract recruits from Latino communities. If the future of the military is a Latino one (see Dempsey and Shapiro 2009), researchers will need to better understand how this group views the military and military service.

Little is known about how Latino communities view the military, however, either before or after 9/11 and the war in Iraq. Survey research based on data from the 1990s has found evidence that Latinos are particularly supportive of young people joining the military (Leal 2005). This is not surprising in light of research on how military service has been used by minority groups, including Latinos (Leal, Nichols, and Teigen 2010), as a bridging and legitimating device to close economic gaps as well as to help them demonstrate their patriotism to a sometimes skeptical wider audience (Guzman 1976; Sullivan 2014). Indeed, research has noted how military service has promoted minority political incorporation throughout American political development (Krebs 2006; Riesenberg 1992; Samito 2009; Smith 1981). Specifically, historians have pointed out that military experiences, especially during World War II, helped galvanize Latino veterans into political action. After fighting against fascism overseas, they were inspired to fight against political barriers at home (Morin 1966; Tirado 1970; Garcia 1985; Sullivan 2014).

Similar factors suggest that African American views about the military may also be positive. In terms of race relations and opportunities for minorities, the military over the last half century has been a particularly hospitable institution in comparison to civilian society (Brink and Harris 1967; Moskos and Butler 1996; Ricks 1996). For instance, the military was desegregated before *Brown v. Board of Education*, and military service may help African Americans (as well as other minorities) to advance socially and economically in the civilian world (Browning, Lopreato, and Poston 1973; Martindale and Poston 1979; Xie 1992; Weede 1993; Prokos and Padevic 2000).<sup>5</sup> The military experience of veterans was also a crucial factor in inspiring and sustaining many participants in the African American civil rights movement (Parker 2009).

On the other hand, the war in Iraq may have temporarily or permanently changed some of these dynamics. For instance, African American enlistments have been significantly lower in the twenty-first century. According to the *Boston Globe*:

Defense Department statistics show the number of young black enlistees has fallen by more than 58 percent since fiscal year 2000. The Army in particular has been hit hard: In fiscal year 2000, according to the Pentagon statistics, more than 42,000 black men and women applied to enlist; in fiscal year 2005 . . . just over 17,000 signed up (Williams and Baron 2007).<sup>6</sup>

Although this study cannot directly determine the causes of this decline, or gauge its permanence, it can test for racial and ethnic gaps in attitudes toward the military, joining the military, and supporting military-friendly personnel policies, respectively.

### **Demographics and Politics— Civil-Military Concerns and Possible Mediation Effects**

Group-based differences of opinion on military-related issues are important for two additional reasons. First, from the vantage point of civil-military relations, public confidence in the military may serve as barometer of wellness. High levels of support indicate that the public has both “a high regard for the military and its mission . . . and little fear of military abuses in the domestic arena” (Hill, Wong and Gerras 2013: 49). It is, however, possible that generally high levels of support could mask significant group-based differences of opinion (besides those based on race/ethnicity). Gaps based on demographic factors like gender, religion, education, income, age, veteran status, or citizenship could be problematic if they lowered support for the military across a cluster of issues. Perhaps even more troubling could be gaps based on political factors like ideology or attitudes toward contentious public-policy initiatives.

The last decade has seen a renewal and widening of political divisions. Ideologically based, partisan voting in the U.S. Congress is steadily growing (Therault 2008). Redistricting has created incumbents who are increasingly secure but ideologically extreme (Brunell 2008); and, at the same time, the electorate is supposedly divided into “red” and “blue” states (although see Fiorina 2006; Kaufmann, Petrocik, and Shaw 2008). Differences over contentious policy issues, such as the war in Iraq and immigrant amnesty, have also increased political divisions. However, very little is known about whether the public supports either allowing


“undocumented” immigrants to serve in the military (currently they are not allowed) or awarding them citizenship for military service.

Second, it is possible that demographic and/or political factors may mediate the relationship between race/ethnicity and public opinion on military-related issues. If so, the race/ethnicity variable works by influencing a third, “mediating” factor that then affects the attitude under study (Baron and Kenny 1986). If this hypothesis is true, it would then be mistaken to conclude that race/ethnicity has no influence on opinion, even if its effect is not direct. It is possible to begin to test for this possibility by following the framework of “mediation analysis” and using a multistep investigative process (Judd and Kenny 1981; James and Brett 1984; Frazier, Tix, and Baron 2004). However, findings would remain merely suggestive. The hypothesized relationship works as depicted in figure 1. Here, the influence of independent variable X ( $IV_X$ ), upon dependent variable Y ( $DV_Y$ ), is mediated by independent variable M ( $IV_M$ ).

*Expectations*

*To Research Question #1:* While there is no previous research studying all five of the particular attitudes examined in this study and on which expectations could be based, variance in opinion is still expected across the cluster of military-related issues. This is what Butler and Johnson found in their study of multiple, yet different, military-related issues in 1991. Following their findings, *high general support for the military is not expected to translate into broad, across-the-board support for military-related issues*, even though the underlying policies in question may help the military fulfill its recruitment needs and indicate robustness within civil-military relations.

**Figure 1**  
**Hypothesized Mediating Relationship**



*To Research Question #2:* Below the level of aggregate support, group-based variance of opinion should be expected. More specifically, *some factors in this study accounting for racial/ethnic, demographic, and political differences should be found to directly influence attitudes on military-related issues.* Again, scholarship is lacking on some of the questions under study here. Yet, it is interesting to note, Butler and Johnson found that while “race and income have little effect on attitudes towards the military,” veteran status and age are positively related to support for the military while education is negatively related (1991: 273). Whether these specific relationships are still expected to hold is discussed in detail below. However, I expect something not considered by Butler and Johnson: *race/ethnicity should be mediated by other factors.*

Generally, it is expected that some racial/ethnic, demographic, and political factors will be consistently significant and with signs in the same direction. Meanwhile, others will likely vary according to the question. For instance, it might be expected that those who supported the war in Iraq are more likely to support the military across the cluster of related issues, whereas higher socioeconomic status (SES) individuals might be less likely to advise youth to join the military but be more likely to support the draft.

Within the race/ethnicity based factors, Anglos are the base category against which comparisons are made. Based on previous research (Leal 2005), it is expected that there will be little difference in overall support for the military between these groups, but Latinos may be more likely to encourage others to join the military. As Latinos constitute a significant share of the immigrant population in Texas, they may be more likely to support undocumented immigrants joining the military and receiving citizenship from such service.<sup>7</sup> Given declining African American enlistments in recent years, African American respondents may be more likely to be opposed to advising the youth to join the military.

Demographic factors are probably the most variant and hardest to predict. They will be discussed in the order that they later appear in regression analysis. Men are generally more interested in the military (Cohen 1966). Women are less supportive of the use of force in general (Smith 1984; Poole and Zeigler 1985). Indeed, as Verba, Schlozman, and Brady observed, “to the extent that there are opinion differences between the sexes, they tend to be more pronounced on issues like war and the use of violence than on what are often referred to as ‘women’s issues’” (1995: 252). Thus, a gender gap is expected in attitudes about



the military as an institution, with women being less supportive of it and the draft, and less inclined to advise youth to join.

It might be expected that religiosity is associated with military attitudes. First, researchers now know that some important social and political outcomes can be predicted using measures of religious “behavior” and/or religious “belonging” (e.g., church affiliation) (Driskell et al.; Bridge 2014; Nichols 2015). This is to say that individuals of different denominations who spend similar amounts of time attending religious services may be expected to behave similarly, regardless of which church they attend (Layman 2001; Olson and Green 2006). High church attendance is now associated with conservative politics, which may mean that this measure is expected to increase support for the military. On the other hand, Catholics might be less likely to support the military but more likely to support the draft and citizenship for service—given their church’s teaching about war, immigration, and social justice.

There is some reason to expect individuals with lower education or income to be more supportive of military service, as the military has long been associated with economic opportunity and social advancement (Janowitz 1971; Leal, Nichols, and Teigen 2010). However, high SES individuals were more supportive of military interventions in the past (Modigliani 1972), and might be more supportive of the draft. Age is considered because some research indicates that older citizens express high levels of support for the military (Butler and Johnson 1991; Goetzl 1987). However, this may be a degenerating artifact of a generational effect that is dissipating because of the passing of the World War II cohort. Baby boomers, whose formative experiences include the Vietnam War, may be less supportive of the military. Veterans might be expected to be more likely both to support the military as an institution and to advise in favor of joining it. Additionally, they may be one of the few groups more likely to support the draft. Lastly, among demographic factors, American citizens may be expected to be less likely to support the enlistment of undocumented immigrants and the granting of citizenship for such service. Citizens might also be more supportive of the military in general and more likely to encourage youth to join.

Expectations are clear-cut for the political factors. The Democratic Party has for decades been less supportive of an interventionist foreign policy and military spending. In the twenty-first century, ideologically liberal Democrats gained control of their party’s congressional leadership and made opposition to President Bush and the war in Iraq central to their (successful) strategy to win back the Senate and House of

Representatives in 2006. Therefore, it may be expected that the more ideologically liberal a respondent is (on a five-point scale), the less likely he/she will be to support the military and advise young people to join the institution. However, given liberals' views on social justice, it is expected that they will be no less likely to support the draft than others.

Contentious public policy issues add to the polarization of the contemporary era. Two in particular stand out for consideration in this study: (1) support for the war in Iraq; and (2) support for immigrant amnesty (see Appendix A for the wording of these questions).<sup>8</sup> There is no good theoretical reason to think that attitudes about either of these policy issues will influence opinion on every military-related issue, so these factors are not always included in the same model specifications. However, it is expected that those who are most supportive of the war in Iraq will be most likely to support the military and the draft, and to advise youth to join the institution.<sup>9</sup> By contrast, it is expected that those who support an immigration amnesty will be most supportive of opening enlistment opportunities to undocumented immigrants and granting citizenship for such service.

Finally, expectations regarding the hypothesized mediating relationship are established. For one variable to mediate a relationship with another, the two independent variables involved must be correlated themselves. It is therefore expected that the Latino and African American variables will be found to be moderately correlated (between .30 and .70) with other demographic and political factors. Within the framework of mediation analysis, evidence suggesting a mediating relationship is found when two things occur after a correlated variable is added to a specification already demonstrating a statistically significant relationship between a particular variable and attitude: First, the prior existing relationship loses its statistical significance, and, second, the correlated variable develops a statistically significant relationship with the attitude. Both conditions are expected to be met when the group of demographic and/or partisan variables are added to a base specification, including only racial/ethnic determinants.

### **Data and Method**

This study examines a Texas preelection survey (which is archived at the Irma Rangel Public Policy Institute at the University of Texas at Austin) conducted in 2006 by Behavior Research Center of Phoenix, Arizona. The statewide sample includes 1,208 Texas residents and was conducted from September to early November in both English and

Spanish. The respondents consisted of 402 Latinos, 406 African Americans, and 400 Anglos.

This study uses this relatively recent single-state survey for three reasons. First, the survey includes a range of questions about military-related issues. This is extremely uncommon and presents a rare opportunity (in this domain) to study public opinion along several dimensions. This breadth is necessary to explore the first research question: whether high confidence in the military translates into broad support across a cluster of important military-related issues.

Second, the sample is unusually representative in terms of race and ethnicity. Most surveys feature minority samples that either encompass few individuals or do not adequately represent those populations. However, this survey actually allows a more confident assessment of the attitudes of these groups than is possible with almost any national survey of similar size. Furthermore, to ensure a representative Latino sample, the survey used a bilingual questionnaire and bilingual interviewers. Many surveys interview Latinos only in English, which creates a biased sample in a number of important ways. All of this helps in establishing whether high confidence in the military translates into uniform support across a wide array of groups.

Finally, public opinion in Texas is important to understand in its own right. While Texans pride themselves on having their own unique identity, the state has both the second largest population and land area of all American states, making its population quite diverse and, thus, demographically more representative of the nation than most other states. Census figures as well as descriptive statistics of the survey's (minority oversampled) sample confirm this (see appendix B, table 4).<sup>10</sup> Furthermore, Texas is a "crucial" type case within social science methodology—that is, a case that (1) "has come to define, or at least exemplify, a concept or theoretical outcome" and/or (2) "reveals a result that is unexpected" (Gerring 2001: 219–20). Texas certainly is paradigmatic. If high confidence in the military translates across issues and groups, where else is it better to study than promilitary Texas, a racially and ethnically diverse state in which a slogan like "Remember the Alamo" still seems to resonate? Indeed, because of its staunchly promilitary inclinations, Texas may also be a "least-likely" case in which to expect to find group-based division and gaps in support. If support is not all-encompassing and monolithic in Texas, where conditions are favorable, then it is not likely to be so elsewhere. Therefore, a lot can be learned from this, particular, single case study.<sup>11</sup>

The five questions drawn from this survey for examination are as follows:

- 1) “Now I’m going to read you the names of some institutions in American society. Please tell me if you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of each one. . . . is that very or somewhat favorable/unfavorable?”
  - b. The Military
- 2) “Would you advise a young person close to you to join the military, or not?”
- 3) “Would you favor a new military draft whereby all young men would serve in the armed forces when they turn 18, or not?”
- 4) “Do you believe that illegal or undocumented immigrants who are living in America should or should not be allowed to volunteer to serve in the U.S. military?”
- 5) “If illegal or undocumented immigrants are allowed to volunteer to serve in the U.S. military, should they be granted American citizenship as a result of their service?”

### *Method*

To investigate this study’s first question—whether high confidence in the military translates into broad support across a cluster of important military-related issues—aggregate Texas opinion is compared. Given the importance of race and ethnicity for military recruitment efforts, this study leverages the rare oversample of Latinos and African Americans to juxtapose like-sized groups for comparison. This helps bring to light any aggregate differences in attitudes between the Anglo, Latino, and African American groups. However, in order to fully answer this study’s second question and determine whether high confidence in, and support for, the military translates into uniform support across a wide array of groups, regression analysis is needed. This helps determine whether race/ethnicity, demographic, or political factors directly influence attitudes on each of the five military-related issues, while controlling for the effect of the others.

Because there are either three or four response options to the first three questions, ordered probit analysis is used.<sup>12</sup> Conversely, since there are only two possible responses for the last two questions, probit analysis is used. Model specifications for regression analysis of each of the five attitudes are constructed in a stair-step method (following the framework for mediation analysis). That is, each question is analyzed three ways. In the first model, only the two race/ethnicity factors are included in the specification. The second model additionally includes demography-based

variables. The third model adds political factors to the mix. Conducting analysis through a series of multivariate regression models for each dependent variable allows for exploration of the mediating variable hypothesis, while determining which factors influence attitudes directly. Both factors with a direct impact upon an attitude and those that work indirectly—through mediation—are important. They suggest the group-based source of gaps in support.

## Findings

### *In the Aggregate*

Aggregate Texas opinion is shown by race and ethnicity in the columns in table 1. It demonstrates that the military received a very high level of overall support across the three groups surveyed: 88 percent of Latinos, 87 percent of African Americans, and 90 percent of Anglos reported very or somewhat supportive ratings. By way of indirect comparison, Gallup's June 2006 survey found that 73 percent of all Americans expressed a "great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence in the military (Gallup 2006). Texas is thus confirmed as a paradigmatic example of the highly "pro-military" state, which is crucial to examine for divisions and gaps in attitudes on military-related issues.

Of the four military-related issues, respondents were most supportive of granting undocumented aliens citizenship for military service (87 percent, 75 percent, and 70 percent, respectively); support for undocumented immigrants joining the military (72 percent, 55 percent, and 50 percent, respectively); support for joining the military (52 percent, 43 percent, and 57 percent, respectively); and support for the draft (33 percent, 33 percent, and 35 percent, respectively). The drop-off from general support evidenced in these findings clearly demonstrates that high confidence in, and support for, the military does not translate into all-encompassing support across a cluster of military-related issues. Attitudes toward the military are more complex than a single question can answer. Indeed, the high degree of support for the military as an institution can obscure opinion differences among other issue dimensions. Therefore, if transference of support is too casually assumed, the results of Gallup's annual "confidence" question become misleading.

Table 1 also shows some variation by race and ethnicity across the five questions. Latinos and African Americans are both less likely than Anglos to be "very supportive" of the military, and are twice as likely to hold unfavorable views. This sort of detail is obscured by the common

**Table 1**  
**Aggregate Latino, African American, and Anglo Support for the Military**

	<i>Latino</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>African American</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Anglo</i>	<i>%</i>
<b>Military evaluation</b>						
<i>Very favorable</i>	212	59.4	206	54.1	256	66.7
<i>Somewhat favorable</i>	101	28.3	127	33.3	105	27.3
<i>Somewhat unfavorable</i>	21	5.9	25	6.6	17	4.4
<i>Very unfavorable</i>	23	6.4	23	6.0	6	1.6
<b>Advise join the military</b>						
<i>Yes</i>	203	52.1	169	43.0	220	56.6
<i>Don't Know</i>	50	12.9	29	7.4	35	9.0
<i>No</i>	136	35.0	195	49.6	134	34.4
<b>New draft</b>						
<i>Yes</i>	130	33.3	131	32.7	138	34.9
<i>Don't Know</i>	26	6.7	20	5.0	20	5.1
<i>No</i>	234	60.0	249	62.3	237	60.0
<b>Undocumented immigrant enlistment</b>						
<i>Yes</i>	276	72.4	209	55.4	189	49.9
<i>No</i>	105	27.6	168	44.6	190	50.1
<b>Citizenship for service</b>						
<i>Yes</i>	335	87.0	296	75.3	267	70.4
<i>No</i>	50	13.0	97	24.7	112	29.6

*Source:* Texas Poll 2006

practice of aggregating favorable responses into one category. Latino support for joining the military is high, but surprisingly not as high as that of Anglos—findings that suggest a decline in past, higher support (Leal 2005). Latinos are no more likely to support a draft than are African Americans or Anglos, a policy option not very popular across any group. African Americans are confirmed to express the lowest support for advising youth to join the military. However, they express views

about undocumented immigrants serving and receiving citizenship that are between those of Latino and Anglo respondents. Latinos are, unsurprisingly, most supportive of both these policy options. All these findings reveal that there is no uniformity of opinion between these groups. However, regression analysis is needed to determine if race/ethnicity plays a direct role in influencing the attitudes reported.

### *Regression Results*

The following sections present the results of regression analysis (see table 2). Each of the five attitudes is modeled in three different ways to allow preliminary testing of the mediation hypothesis. However, the description of results proceeds, in turn, by groups of explanatory variable—first, race/ethnicity, then demographic, and finally political. Within each explanatory variable grouping's narrative, special attention focuses on the results of each question's Model 3, which always contains the specification that explains the most variance. Only statistically significant variables in Model 3 will have their substantive impact explored later in the discussion. Consideration of evidence for mediation accompanies presentation of results for the racial/ethnic group of variables.

Generally, the models of attitudes perform well. Table 2 indicates that seven out of thirteen variables are statistically significant in one Model 3 or another. While racial/ethnic variables always drop out in the final model for each attitude, demographic and political factors are often statistically significant. Indeed, in four out of five cases, both categories of variables are significant in Model 3. In every case, there is an explanatory improvement from Model 1 to Model 3, with the pseudo R-squared improving to a study best of .114 for attitudes on Advise Joining the Military (Model 3). This indicates that a reasonably good amount of variance is explained.

### *Race-/Ethnicity-Based Factors*

Never are race-/ethnicity-based factors found to be statistically significant predictors of an attitude examined in Model 3. This indicates—most simply—that once demographic and political factors are controlled for, race/ethnicity do not directly influence any opinions studied on military-related issues in Texas. Yet this is not the whole story. Indeed, it may be an inaccurate basis for concluding that neither race nor ethnicity plays a role in shaping these attitudes.

**Table 2**  
**Ordered Probit and Probit Analysis of Attitudes on Military-Related Issues**

Variable	Support for the Military			Advise Joining the Military			Reinstating the Draft			Service for Undocumented			Citizenship for Service		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Latino	-0.261** (0.088)	-0.173 (0.135)	0.008 (0.146)	-0.064 (0.086)	-0.234^ (0.125)	-0.034 (0.134)	-0.015 (0.088)	-0.074 (0.131)	-0.042 (0.138)	0.597*** (0.094)	0.306* (0.132)	0.176 (0.138)	0.588*** (0.105)	0.203 (0.150)	0.080 (0.158)
African American	-0.354*** (0.084)	-0.322** (0.101)	0.005 (0.114)	-0.369*** (0.088)	-0.527*** (0.103)	-0.154 (0.116)	-0.059 (0.088)	-0.214 (0.107)	-0.114 (0.116)	0.140 (0.091)	0.168 (0.105)	0.111 (0.120)	0.147 (0.096)	0.146 (0.113)	0.069 (0.130)
Gender	-0.026 (0.099)	0.059 (0.108)	0.005 (0.105)	-0.243* (0.097)	-0.150 (0.102)	-0.150 (0.105)	-0.207* (0.104)	-0.169 (0.108)	-0.169 (0.108)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.184^ (0.107)	0.190^ (0.112)	0.151 (0.118)	0.151 (0.118)	0.141 (0.123)
Church Attendance	0.003 (0.023)	0.001 (0.024)	0.001 (0.024)	-0.369*** (0.088)	-0.527*** (0.103)	-0.154 (0.116)	-0.059 (0.088)	-0.214 (0.107)	-0.114 (0.116)	0.140 (0.091)	0.168 (0.105)	0.111 (0.120)	0.147 (0.096)	0.146 (0.113)	0.069 (0.130)
Catholic	-0.078 (0.119)	0.003 (0.128)	0.003 (0.128)	-0.043 (0.110)	0.047 (0.120)	0.047 (0.120)	0.047 (0.120)	0.047 (0.120)	0.047 (0.120)	0.047 (0.120)	0.047 (0.120)	0.047 (0.120)	0.047 (0.120)	0.047 (0.120)	0.047 (0.120)
Education	0.024 (0.036)	0.049 (0.036)	0.049 (0.036)	-0.062^ (0.036)	-0.048 (0.036)	-0.048 (0.036)	-0.048 (0.036)	-0.048 (0.036)	-0.048 (0.036)	-0.048 (0.036)	-0.048 (0.036)	-0.048 (0.036)	-0.048 (0.036)	-0.048 (0.036)	-0.048 (0.036)
Income	-0.048 (0.110)	-0.037 (0.111)	-0.037 (0.111)	0.070 (0.106)	0.105 (0.112)	0.105 (0.112)	0.105 (0.112)	0.105 (0.112)	0.105 (0.112)	0.105 (0.112)	0.105 (0.112)	0.105 (0.112)	0.105 (0.112)	0.105 (0.112)	0.105 (0.112)
Age	-0.007* (0.003)	-0.005 (0.003)	-0.005 (0.003)	-0.007* (0.003)	-0.007* (0.003)	-0.007* (0.003)	-0.007* (0.003)	-0.007* (0.003)	-0.007* (0.003)	-0.007* (0.003)	-0.007* (0.003)	-0.007* (0.003)	-0.007* (0.003)	-0.007* (0.003)	-0.007* (0.003)
Veteran	0.174 (0.140)	0.145 (0.149)	0.145 (0.149)	0.229 (0.141)	0.236 (0.149)	0.236 (0.149)	0.236 (0.149)	0.236 (0.149)	0.236 (0.149)	0.236 (0.149)	0.236 (0.149)	0.236 (0.149)	0.236 (0.149)	0.236 (0.149)	0.236 (0.149)
Citizen	0.202 (0.159)	0.361* (0.169)	0.361* (0.169)	-0.091*** (0.026)	0.165 (0.154)	0.165 (0.154)	0.165 (0.154)	0.165 (0.154)	0.165 (0.154)	0.165 (0.154)	0.165 (0.154)	0.165 (0.154)	0.165 (0.154)	0.165 (0.154)	0.165 (0.154)
Ideology	-0.091*** (0.026)	0.356*** (0.058)	0.356*** (0.058)	-0.065* (0.028)	0.165 (0.154)	0.165 (0.154)	0.165 (0.154)	0.165 (0.154)	0.165 (0.154)	0.165 (0.154)	0.165 (0.154)	0.165 (0.154)	0.165 (0.154)	0.165 (0.154)	0.165 (0.154)
War in Iraq	-0.091*** (0.026)	0.356*** (0.058)	0.356*** (0.058)	-0.065* (0.028)	0.165 (0.154)	0.165 (0.154)	0.165 (0.154)	0.165 (0.154)	0.165 (0.154)	0.165 (0.154)	0.165 (0.154)	0.165 (0.154)	0.165 (0.154)	0.165 (0.154)	0.165 (0.154)
Amnesty	-0.091*** (0.026)	0.356*** (0.058)	0.356*** (0.058)	-0.065* (0.028)	0.165 (0.154)	0.165 (0.154)	0.165 (0.154)	0.165 (0.154)	0.165 (0.154)	0.165 (0.154)	0.165 (0.154)	0.165 (0.154)	0.165 (0.154)	0.165 (0.154)	0.165 (0.154)
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.008	.017	.083	.005	.023	.114	.001	.079	.093	.034	.053	.086	.033	.051	.088
Observations	1122	895	860	1170	922	884	1184	934	899	1136	905	841	1156	918	850

Source: Texas Poll 2006

Note: Cut points and intercept are not presented. The data were weighted by race and ethnicity to reflect the Anglo, Latino, and African American shares of the state population (including only these groups). All tests of significance are two-tailed. Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis under coefficient.

^ p ≤ .10; \* p ≤ .05; \*\* p ≤ .01; \*\*\* p ≤ .001



There is good evidence that the influence of race/ethnicity is often mediated by another variable. This could still be problematic for the military's recruitment efforts and may not be healthy for civic-military relations in the long run. Evidence for mediation of the race/ethnicity impact is found in four out of five dimensions of study. Indeed, the only place mediation does not appear to occur is in influencing uniformly low opinion about the draft. Here, neither the *Latino* nor *African American* variable is statistically significant in Model 1—which includes only race/ethnicity variables. Therefore, the first condition for mediation is not met. Everywhere else, however, the first condition is met and one or the other race/ethnicity variable is found to directly influence the attitude under analysis.

Furthermore, in every one of these cases, there is some evidence that the second and third conditions for mediation are met. That is, when a group of demographic and/or political factors is added to the explanatory specification, (1) the race/ethnicity variable loses statistical significance, while (2) a moderately correlated variable becomes a statistically significant predictor. For example, consider support for the military. Here, both variables are statistically significant and negative predictors of attitudes in Model 1. With the addition of demographic factors in Model 2, *Latino* loses its statistical significance, while the *Age* variable (correlated with *Latino* at  $-.261$ ) becomes statistically significant. Then, when the political factors are added in Model 3, *African American* loses its significance while liberal *Ideology* (correlated at  $.299$ ) gains statistical significance. Similar evidence of mediation can be found in: Advise Joining the Military (*African American* and *Ideology*); Service for the Undocumented (*Latino* and *Income*); and Citizenship for Service (*Latino* and both *Catholic* and *Age*). Correlations for all these relationships can be found embedded within figure 2, which visually presents the mediating relationships suggested by this study's findings.

In considering the influence of race-/ethnicity-based factors, full consideration of regression results—utilizing three steps of mediation analysis (Baron and Kenny 1986)—presents a more muddled picture. While these factors do not directly impact the attitudes under investigation, they may very well influence other variables that have a direct effect. Since earlier researchers, like Butler and Johnson, did not consider an indirect effect as a possibility when they reported that race did not influence opinion on military-related issues (1991), future scholarship is needed to look more deeply into the possibility.

### *Demographic Factors*

As suggested above, a number of demographic variables are statistically significant determinants of an attitude studied in Model 3. They include: *Catholic*, *Age*, *Veteran*, and *Citizen*. With the exception of *Age*—which is the only factor significantly influencing more than one attitude at the  $p < .05$  level of statistical significance—each of these factors works in a positive direction. This makes increased support more likely. Older respondents in Texas were likewise more supportive of a draft. However, they were simultaneously less likely to advise youth to join the military or support granting citizenship for service.

Additional demographic insights are suggested when considering findings at the  $p < .10$  level of statistical significance. Here, *Gender* and *Income* become statistically significant predictors of an attitude analyzed in Model 3, and the *Catholic* and *Citizen* variables demonstrate additional robustness. *Gender*, which narrowly misses being a negative predictor of support for the draft, is revealed to exert a positive influence on support for allowing undocumented immigrants to serve in the military. Citizens are found to be less likely to support this policy option. *Income* and *Catholic* work to make support for the draft more likely.

### *Political Factors*

All of the political factors are found to be statistically significant predictors of multiple attitudes analyzed in Model 3. All work as expected and in their expected directions. First, *Ideology* (liberal) lowers support for the military and makes it less likely for Texas liberals to advise youth to join (while having no effect upon support for the draft). Second, support for the war in Iraq directly translates into higher support for the military and the draft, and increases the likelihood of advising youth to join the ranks. Finally, in Texas, support for immigrant amnesty positively affects support for allowing undocumented immigrants to serve and for rewarding them with citizenship for this service.

## **Discussion**

My final discussion proceeds as follows. First, the substantive impact of the statistically significant factors are considered. While it is not a straightforward proposition to interpret a single variable's effect within either ordered probit or probit analysis, the impact of each can be discussed in relation to the others (table 3). Second, expected conclusions

are discussed. The focus in this section is on what the study’s findings suggest about future military recruiting efforts, the state of civil-military relations, and opportunities for future scholarship.

*Overall Support for the Military*

Support for the military as an institution remains high in “promilitary” Texas—even as only 32 percent of the respondents said that the invasion of Iraq was the right decision, 51 percent said it was the wrong decision, and 17 percent were unsure. On the surface, this seems to suggest a very healthy state of civil-military affairs and, in the aggregate, an unpopular war does not appear to affect Texans’ support for the military. Yet there is reason for worry, as holding the two attitudes simultaneously may eventually generate cognitive dissonance, which is likely to sap support for the military.

In regard to overall support, table 3 reports the number of percentage points impact that a single factor has—calculated using Model 3—in changing the probability of moving from holding an “unfavorable” to “favorable” opinion of the military. So, for example, after setting all other independent variables at their values at the mean, the substantive impact of being an American citizen in Texas raises the probability of moving from holding an unfavorable to a favorable opinion 13.48 percentage points. The relative impact of the *Ideology* (liberal) and *War in Iraq* variables is even greater. The first lowers the probability of holding the most favorable attitude (from a baseline of holding the least favorable attitude) 19.88 percentage points. The latter raises the probability 25.61 percentage points.

**Table 3**  
**Substantive Impact of a Single IV on a Military-Related Attitude**  
 (as a number of percentage points)<sup>15</sup>

<i>statically significant IV</i>	Support for Military	Advise Joining	The Draft	Service for Undocumented	Citizenship for Service
<i>Catholic</i>					8.37
<i>Age</i>		-6.59	14.59		-5.78
<i>Veteran</i>			24.91		
<i>Citizen</i>	13.48				
<i>Ideology</i>	-19.88	-15.58			
<i>War in Iraq</i>	25.61	37.99	15.10		
<i>Amnesty</i>				23.37	23.62

### *Advise Joining the Military*

From the point of view of military recruitment, this may be the most important question in the study. It is therefore important to highlight that, in 2006, there was a considerable drop-off between support for the institution and the likelihood of advising youth to join the military. While 89.9 percent of Texas respondents viewed the military favorably, only 50.6 percent would encourage the young to join its ranks. And, in what could be an important reversal of previous trends (Leal 2005), fewer Latinos than Anglos indicated support along this dimension. Whether this change of opinion reflects the difference in samples or timeframes is unclear, but it would appear to warrant continued observation.<sup>13</sup> Furthermore, there is evidence that the effect of race is mediated by ideology, and that the *African American* variable is indirectly lowering support.

Substantively, *Ideology* (liberal) and support for the war in Iraq continue to have large impacts upon this attitude. As table 3 indicates, moving from the far right end to the far left end of the liberal-conservative spectrum lowers the probability of moving from a “no” to “yes” advise response by 15.58 percentage points, while toggling to support for the war in Iraq raises the probability 37.99 percentage points. Age has also has an impact, but less so. A sixty-five-year-old Texan has a 6.59 percentage point lower probability than a thirty-nine-year-old of advising youth to join the military. This reversal of Butler and Johnson’s 1991 findings suggest that the “generation gap” may now work in the other direction, with the elderly now being less supportive of military-related issues. This too bears further consideration.

### *Support for the Draft*

Although a new draft is less unpopular in relatively conservative Texas than in other parts of the country,<sup>14</sup> the idea finds little support among any racial or ethnic group in the state. High support for the military clearly does not translate into support for reinstating the draft. Interestingly, however, opinions on the draft are positively shaped by *Veteran* status, *Age*, and support for the *War in Iraq*. More specifically, the probability of supporting the draft is raised 24.91, 14.59, and 15.10 percentage points by each, respectively. An obvious explanation for why age works in the opposite direction in structuring this attitude is that younger respondents, who would be subject to a draft, are very unsupportive. Thus, it may not

be the case that baby boomers are particularly enthusiastic about the draft. The young may simply be disproportionately against it.

Also of note is the fact that liberal ideology does not impact draft opinion. This may reflect a feeling among some liberals that, with a draft, the sacrifices of war would be better shared by all parts of the community, thereby bringing them more in line with those conservatives who support a draft for different reasons. For instance, during the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. Representative Charlie Rangel (D-NY) introduced a bill to reinstate the draft, although this effort was not enthusiastically received by Congress or the Bush administration.


### *Support for Undocumented Immigrant Service*

While support for undocumented immigrant military service is relatively high in Texas, quite a few more Latinos support this policy option than do Anglos (72.4 percent to 49.9 percent). It is therefore somewhat surprising that the *Latino* variable is not a statistically significant predictor of this attitude. The best explanation for this is that the effect of *Latino* is mediated by another variable(s). All the various mediation possibilities are visually represented in figure 2. However, in this case it is most probable that the *Latino-Citizen* relationship is (at least partially) responsible for mediating the *Latino-Attitude* relationship. Future scholarship may attempt to determine the substantive effect of this very complex possibility. Support for immigrant *Amnesty* is the only variable that has a direct substantive impact. It increases the probability of support for undocumented service by 26.37 percentage points.

### *Support for Citizenship for Undocumented Immigrant Service*

In the aggregate, this policy option receives substantial support in Texas. However, granting citizenship for service is about 20 percentage points more popular than letting undocumented immigrants serve in the first place among Anglos and African Americans, so this support must be qualified. Taken together, these findings support the conclusion that military service still allows those with veteran status to make strong claims for greater social and political inclusion (Lamm 2013). It may further suggest that recognition of this fact influences attitudes about who should serve in the first place. As a result, it remains uncertain as to whether expanding service opportunities to the undocumented really constitutes a viable recruitment option for the military.

Figure 2  
Potential Mediators of Race-/Ethnicity-Based Factors



Substantively, being *Catholic* and supporting an immigrant *Amnesty* positively impact support for citizenship for service. The former increases the probability of support by 8.37 percentage points and the latter by 23.62 percentage points. Meanwhile, *Age* negatively impacts this attitude. The probability of supporting citizenship for service is 5.78 percentage points lower for a sixty-five-year-old Texan than for a thirty-nine-year-old. The fact that Catholics are more supportive of granting citizenship for service could reflect the proimmigrant teachings of the Catholic Church or its more general emphasis on social justice. Further research is needed. Again, it may not be the case that older respondents are particularly against this policy. It simply could be that youth are especially supportive of it. Finally, the fact that attitudes on amnesty have a large impact on support for this military-related issue shows that opinions about the military are anything but immune from contemporary political debates. However, while political-based differences in opinion have the potential to undermine civil-military relations, much depends on whether polarization continues to increase in the future and how the military responds to it.

### Conclusion

Although the military has long maintained a high level of support, little is known about whether confidence in this institution translates into broad support for a cluster of military-related issues. In addition, not much

is known about how uniform the support is and whether race/ethnicity, demographic, and political factors influence these attitudes. Yet, these are both theoretically and substantively important issues to sociologists and political scientists because public opinion has an important impact on military recruitment efforts and civil-military relations.

In sum, attitudes on military-related issues in Texas reflect neither all-encompassing nor monolithic support for the institution. Aggregate divisions and group-based gaps are widely observed. While overall support is found to be high in promilitary Texas, there is little support for reinstatement of the draft, and barely half of the Texans surveyed would advise young people to join the military. Support for allowing undocumented immigrants to serve in the military and granting citizenship accordingly receive majority but not overwhelming backing. In fact, demographic factors like veteran status, citizenship status, age, and Catholic Church membership all directly and substantively affect attitudes. Political factors relating to ideology and opinion on contentious public policy debates—like the war in Iraq and immigrant amnesty—also have an impact. Additionally, there is evidence that the influence of race/ethnicity-based factors is mediated by other variables. This leaves open the possibility that there are gaps in opinion that are indirectly influenced by Latino and/or African American group membership.

The final conclusion is therefore mixed. While nothing in this study appears to immediately endanger the military's recruiting efforts or gravely undermine civil-military relations, there are signs of trends that bear watching. First, support for joining the military was significantly down in Texas in 2006. Latinos joined African Americans in being less willing to advise youth to join the military than Anglos. Further evidence was found that race indirectly lowers support via mediation by ideology. Second, political factors are consistently and substantively important. Liberal ideology lowers overall support for the military and support for joining, while views on contentious public policy debates greatly impact attitudes on every military-related issue.

While these results reflect only opinion in Texas, the survey's minority group oversample and use of bilingual questionnaire/interviewers provides rare confidence (for a sample of its size) that the Latino and African American attitudes expressed are representative. Furthermore, Texas is a paradigmatic example of a "promilitary" state where variance is least likely expected. This makes the results of this study crucial from a research design perspective. In this instance, what is found in Texas is more than likely to be found elsewhere in the United States. Ultimately,

opinions about military-related issues are shown to be too varied to be captured in a single “confidence” question about the institution itself. I end by noting that attitudes toward military-related issues are multifaceted, and it is therefore recommended that researchers continue to follow Butler and Johnson’s example (1991) and utilize survey instruments designed to capture its complexity whenever possible.

### Endnotes

1. The author gives special thanks to Dr. David Leal for providing invaluable assistance on this project and granting access to the Texas Survey, which was funded—in part—by the Irma Rangel Public Policy Institute at the University of Texas, at Austin. He further acknowledges the research and leave support given to him by both the Kinder Forum on Constitutional Democracy, at the University of Missouri, and Baylor University. Three anonymous viewers are also thanked for their helpful suggestions.
2. The term “undocumented” immigrant is used throughout the rest of this article. The 2006 Texas survey questionnaire employed the phrase “illegal or undocumented immigrants.”
3. For a discussion of the core areas and issues in military sociology, see Siebold (2001).
4. There are other important factors to consider as well. Scholars have documented how the Irish-, African-, Native-, and Japanese-American and even Latino populations have used military service to stake a claim for greater recognition of social and political rights (Krebs 2006; Samito 2009; Walsh 1994). In the nineteenth century, propertyless veterans were able to use their sacrifice and status to undermine property-restricted suffrage laws (Adams 1980; Williamson 1960). All of this suggests that, while veteran status does not guarantee equality within a republic like the United States, it generates strong normative and rhetorical leverage within democratic theory for those who have served to effect greater social and political inclusion for themselves (Lamm 2013). In doing so, veteran status enables the military to function as one of the strongest “bridging” institutions in the American polity.
5. Also see Little and Fredland (1979) and Cohen, Segal, and Temme (1992).
6. For a discussion of trends in army recruitment, see Padilla and Laner (2002).
7. These policies are important because the United States has, like many other nations, often extended citizenship to the foreign-born in exchange for military service to the nation—especially during time of war (Janowitz 1976; Plascencia 2009; Tichenor 2002). Foreign-born individuals have, indeed, served in the U.S. military throughout its history and fought in all of its wars. At the time of the survey under study, about 5 percent of America’s 1.4 million military members were foreign-born. This is considerably less than the percentage a century ago, during World War I, when one in five members of the American military was foreign-born (Stock 2006).
8. This is different than the issue of “Green Card soldiers,” which has received significant media attention. While there are an estimated 20,000–30,000 legal immigrants in the military, unauthorized immigrants are not eligible to enlist.
9. For discussion of the predictors of support for the Iraq War, see McCleary, Nalls, and Williams (2009).
10. See census comparison at <http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/48000.html>.
11. For discussion of single-state research, see Nicholson-Crotty and Meier (2002).



12. Butler and Johnson's study (1991) can be criticized on methodological grounds for using OLS regression to analyze similar, ordinal scale responses. They stipulate that they also ran ordered probit regressions, but found no substantive differences.
13. In investigating survey data more contemporaneous to this study's, Leal and Nichols (2013) still found greater Latino support for military leaders.
14. A 2005 Gallup poll found that 85 percent of Americans opposed a return of the draft, as compared to the approximately two-thirds of Texans who did not support a new draft in this survey (Gallup 2005).
15. It is not a straightforward proposition to interpret a single variable's impact within either ordered probit or probit analysis, as the effect of one independent variable is contingent on the values of the others. However, it is possible to set all independent variables at their values at the mean (see table 4 in appendix B for descriptive statistics) and to determine the effect varying one of them has on the probability of a specified outcome. For the dichotomous measures—like *Catholic*, *Veteran*, *Citizen*, *Amnesty*—this is simple enough. It requires toggling the variable from its value at the mean (0 or 1) to its opposite. The impact of ordinal measure variables—like *War in Iraq*—is calculated by varying their values from their minimum to maximum (or vice versa). The impact of the one explanatory variable with continuous measure, *Age*, is achieved by varying its value from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above it. In all cases, these procedures are followed using the specification found in Model 3, and the effect is gauged by toggling the dependent variable from its minimum to maximum value. This is equivalent to a respondent moving from an “unfavorable” to “favorable” opinion about military support, or changing his/her response from a “no” to a “yes” for the final four questions.

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## Appendix A

### Additional question wording

1. Now I'm going to read you the names of some institutions in American society. Please tell me if you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of each one. (Then ask, is that very favorable/unfavorable or somewhat?)
  - a. The public schools
  - b. The military
  - c. The criminal court system in your community
  - d. The police in your community
  - e. The Catholic church

FOR EACH ONE, CODE:

Very favorable ... 1  
 Somewhat favorable ... 2  
 Somewhat unfavorable ... 3  
 Very unfavorably ... 4  
 Don't know ... 8  
 RF/NA ... 9

### Military questions

28. Would you advise a young person close to you to join the military, or not?

Yes ... 1  
 No ... 2  
 It depends (if volunteered) ... 3  
 Don't know ... 8  
 RF/NA ... 9

29. Would you favor a new military draft whereby all young men would serve in the armed forces when they turn 18, or not?

Yes ... 1  
 No ... 2  
 It depends (if volunteered) ... 3  
 Don't know ... 8  
 RF/NA ... 9

30. Have you ever served on active duty in the U.S. military, as a reservist in a state National Guard, or as a reservist in the U.S. military reserves?

Yes, active duty military ... 1  
 Yes, state National Guard ... 2

Yes, U.S. military reserves ... 3  
No ... 4  
DK ... 8  
Refused ... 9

31. Do you think the U.S. did the right thing in sending military forces to Iraq or should the U.S. have stayed out?

Did the right thing ... 1  
Should have stayed out ... 2  
It depends (if volunteered) ... 3  
Don't know ... 8  
Refused ... 9

34. Do you believe that illegal or undocumented immigrants who are living in America should or should not be allowed to serve in the U.S. military?

Yes ... 1  
No ... 2  
Don't know ... 8  
RF/NA ... 9

35. If illegal or undocumented immigrants are allowed to volunteer to serve in the U.S. military, should they be granted American citizenship as a result of their service?

Yes ... 1  
No ... 2  
Don't know ... 8  
RF/NA ... 9

## Appendix B

Table 4  
Descriptive Statistics  
Dependent and Independent Variables

Dependent Variable	Number Responses	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
<i>Military Support</i>	1122	3.451	0.799	1	4
<i>Join the Military</i>	1171	2.108	0.944	1	3
<i>The Draft</i>	1185	1.729	0.933	1	3
<i>Undocumented Service</i>	1137	0.592	0.491	0	1
<i>Service for Citizenship</i>	1157	0.776	0.417	0	1
Independent Variable					
<i>Latino</i>	1208	0.332	0.471	0	1
<i>African American</i>	1208	0.336	0.472	0	1
<i>Gender</i>	1208	0.502	0.500	0	1
<i>Church Attendance</i>	1155	4.632	2.008	1	7
<i>Catholic</i>	1141	0.312	0.463	0	1
<i>Education</i>	1177	3.717	1.502	1	6
<i>Income</i>	1086	0.414	0.492	0	1
<i>Age</i>	1160	52.028	15.338	18	93
<i>Veteran</i>	1179	0.180	0.384	0	1
<i>Citizen</i>	1164	0.871	0.334	0	1
<i>Ideology</i>	1143	4.536	2.100	1	7
<i>Iraq War</i>	1204	1.804	0.891	1	3
<i>Amnesty</i>	1152	.842	0.364	0	1